Home > Forensics, Malware Analysis > Notes on the Regin Malware

Notes on the Regin Malware

Came across an article downplaying the sophistication of the Regin Malware:

http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/incident-detection/why-regin-malware-isnt-the-next-stuxnet/

I thought it was worth making a note about the common techniques that are said to have been used previously. The quotes below are taken directly from the TripWire article by Ken Westin

Many of the “sophisticated” techniques used by Regin have been seen before:

  • Regin’s use of naming a driver something innocuous dates back to some of the first viruses floating around in the DOS days
  • The use of a kernel memory pool tag that is generic is not particularly novel, as it’s the default for most drivers
  • Hiding the MZ executable header marker from an executable memory image is an old technique, as well, dating back to the earliest days of 16-bit DOS executables
  • Hiding encrypted data in the registry or NTFS “extended attribute streams” is something the OS does for legitimate reasons and a technique used by many forms of malware (eg. ZeroAccess)
  • Encrypting data for transport is now standard practice for pretty much all malware

Leveraging forensic artifacts are useful in identifying known malware, but more important is the ability to detect patterns and behavior of malware and quickly searching for indicators of compromise when signatures and artifacts are known.

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